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Introduction 
One important way to mitigate problems in divided societies is to create an electoral system 
befitting of the situation.  In many divided societies, the state has inherited the electoral system of their 
colonizer.  This paper will examine the impact of various electoral systems on ethnic conflict in a divided 
society.  To this end, I will examine the case of Guyana, and compare it with a broader set of other 
divided societies who are in the same type of situation.  While the frequency of ethnic conflict has 
decreased, it is still a major fear in many parts of the world. 
 Guyana has had three electoral systems since the 1940s, with variation in the level of ethnic 
conflict.  In such a situation, it is important to assess the current political system with the intent of 
answering: how do electoral systems exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict?  Specifically does Guyana’s 
electoral system mitigate or exacerbate ethnic conflict, does Guyana need a new electoral system, and 
what are appropriate alternatives? 
  In seeking to explain the impact of an electoral system on ethnic conflict, this project will add to 
knowledge on the subject in four important ways.  First, case studies in this area have generally not 
focused on the Caribbean.  The region provides an important test.  The ethnic divisions in the Caribbean 
tend to be along racial lines, whereas most work focuses on uni-racial ethnic divisions, where ethnicities 
may be more malleable.  Another important factor in the Caribbean is that because there are few 
indigenous people left, the conflict tends to be between recent arrivals from Africa, Asia, and Europe.  
The legacy of slavery and indentured servitude further complicates efforts to solve conflicts in the area. 
 Second, Guyana is a state where the largest racial group is a majority.  This lends to an even more 
intransigent ethnic conflict.  There is little to no incentive for the majority group to seek or allow power 
sharing, since it will hurt their relative position.   
 Third, in Guyana, the minority Afro-Guyanese Forbes Burnham captured the presidency in 1968 
and held the position through rigged elections until his death in 1985.  His successor Desmond Hoyte 
allowed free elections in 1992, when the majority Indo-Guyanese gained power.  During the rule of 
Burnham (1968-1985), the military and police forces acted repressively first against Indo-Guyanese, and 
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later the Afro-Guyanese as well, forcing almost a third of the population to emigrate.  As a result, an air 
of fear and insecurity surrounds politics.  The Afro-Guyanese fear revenge, the Indo-Guyanese fear a 
return of the previous system.  Understanding the intricacies of the case will provide useful information 
on power sharing potentials and options for improvement in similar cases. 
 Finally, this project will look at low intensity ethnic conflict.  Much of the work done on ethnic 
conflict focuses on civil wars and similar high intensity ethnic conflict.  However, high intensity conflicts 
build from low-level ones.  By focusing on the low intensity conflicts, I will broaden the academic 
discussion, and help bring attention to mitigating low-level conflict before it gets out of hand.  While 
difficult, mitigating low-level conflict is easier than ending a civil war and subsequently building a new 
government. 
I argue that the type of electoral system, gauged in terms of presidential versus parliamentary 
system, and in terms of proportional representation (PR) and plurality/majority, makes great strides 
towards explaining the issue of ethnic conflict in divided societies.  PR in a divided society when one 
group makes up more than half of the population will not promote ethnic harmony.  Finally, a power-
sharing arrangement will help prevent ethnic conflict.   
I find that the shift to proportional representation (PR) in 1964 was the most dangerous time in 
Guyana in terms of property destruction and personal violence.  The FPTP system, in place until 1963, 
was the second most dangerous period.  The current system, mixed PR, is the system that has caused the 
least amount of violence and destruction.  To conclude, I offer recommendations to Guyana on how best 
to prevent future conflict. 
 
Literature Review 
Democracy 
Dahl’s polyarchy model is the basis of most current definitions of democracy.  Elections are the 
key to this procedural view.  Dahl calls for the ability to contest the government, and the ability to 
participate in the election of officials (1971).  Diamond, Linz, and Lipset expanded this definition to meet 
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three criteria.  First, there has to be competition for office.  Second, the people must be able to participate 
in the government through elections.  Third, there must be necessary civil and political liberties to ensure 
the integrity of the competition and participation (1995).  Integral to liberal democracy is that the 
government must be able to change hands, in order to prevent the tyranny of the majority.  In divided 
societies with one clearly identifiable ethnic group in the majority, the government is unlikely to change 
hands, and a “liberal democracy…produces aliberal results” (Byman 2002, 127). 
 Mill did not think that democracy could persist in multiethnic states.  He believed that institutions 
would not be able to function properly, since there would be so many countervailing opinions (1948).  
Acton disagreed with Mill and said that the countervailing opinions of various groups would force the 
state to keep from absolutist actions.  Acton envisaged semi-autonomous groups working together in the 
central government (1962). 
 
Divided societies  
Divided societies are those in which there is an ethnic difference among the people in a state.  
Additionally, these ethnic differences must determine politics and political parties.  There are two main 
types of inter-ethnic divisions: ranked and unranked.  In ranked systems, the ethnic groups are 
geographically intermixed, ethnicity determines economic status, and one group dominates the other.  In 
unranked systems, the ethnic groups live in enclaves, race does not determine jobs, and the groups are 
parallel, not hierarchical (Mason 2003).  In unranked systems, the groups are so separated from each other 
that Horowitz describes their relationship as more similar to international relations than intra-state 
relations (1971). 
Ethnic conflict in ranked systems is rare, since the dominant group tends to have so much power 
relative to the weaker groups that if conflict arose, the dominant group would be able to suppress the 
revolt with few problems.  Additionally, it is very difficult for the subordinate group to become a feasible 
opposition, since their lower position means that they have less access to funds and have increased 
problems in mobilization.  In unranked systems, groups tend to have conflict over government control.  
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The major fear of groups in unranked systems is that one group will control the government and use that 
power to favor their own people in a zero sum game.  These groups are more able to fund and support a 
conflict.  This tends to occur in a cycle, as one group wins office, and the other group retaliates.  This 
overwhelming fear of the unranked society turning into a ranked society is the most likely cause of 
conflict in an unranked society (Mason 2003). 
 Many current divided societies were once colonies.  Upon independence, a majority of these new 
states adopted the parliamentary system of their colonial master.  For British colonies, this meant the 
adoption of the Westminster, plurality-based electoral system.  One major tactic of colonial masters was 
to use the divide-and-rule tactic to turn ethnic groups against one another for easier rule, either 
exacerbating an already ranked society, or more sinisterly turning an unranked society into a ranked one 
(Mason 2003).  While ranked societies have less large scale conflict, once a dominant group gains power, 
it attempts to “institutionalize its advantages by enacting policies that reinforce the existing stratification 
system, preserving for its members a monopoly on high status roles and confining the subordinate group 
to low status roles” (Mason 2003, 85).  This allows the dominant group to take important state resources 
for themselves and the subordinate group is less likely to gain social, political, and economic liberties.  
Faced with the aftermath of the divide-and-rule-system and combined with an inappropriate electoral 
system, the new states were under a great deal of stress from the outset. 
 Divided societies have a greater chance of ethnic conflict than just multiethnic states.  A 
necessary step before conflict is the mobilization of the populace along ethnic lines.  Hechter and Levi 
(1979) propose that successful ethnic mobilization occurs if (1) the federal government allows political 
and cultural opposition groups (2) an ethnically based civil society already exists and (3) the opposition 
group is able to organize.  Elites are able to overcome the collective action problem in ethnic conflict 
since they are able to identify their constituency easily, and elites can easily determine if a member of 
their group is not participating in the conflict (Hechter et al 1982).  Generally, if there is a response from 
the state or the opposing group, the response will be against all the members of the ethnic group 
regardless of their prior actions (Mason 2003).  
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Sources of ethnic conflict 
There are several theories of the cause of ethnic conflict described in Byman (2002): the ethnic 
security dilemma, status concerns, hegemonic ambitions, and elite aspirations.  The ethnic security 
dilemma arises in states where the central government is weak, if it exists at all.  In this state, ethnic 
groups are likely to defend themselves and their territories with militias and other armed groups.  
However, the arms accumulation of one group will lead to the arms accumulation of another group, and 
the resulting situation will be worse than before. 
 A second theory is conflict based on status concerns.  Status concerns deal both with what people 
think their group deserves from the state and with the relative status and protection of their ethnic group 
from domination (Byman 2002).  A third theory is hegemonic ambitions.  According to this theory, the 
dominant group will attempt to make the state conform to their ethnic group identity.  For example, the 
dominant group will make their language the official language, and force their religion and culture on the 
other groups and the state facilities.  This is one of the most common explanations of ethnic conflict, 
whether or not hegemonic ambitions actually existed.  Some scholars claim this theory as the reason for 
the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the issue is a continued source of conflict 
throughout much of Africa, as well as in India and Turkey (Byman 2002). 
 Finally, there is the theory of elite competition.  While the previous theories have all been at the 
group level, elite competition focuses on the leaders of the groups.  Elites, for example Slobodan 
Milosevic in Yugoslavia, exacerbate ethnic differences by basing their political parties on ethnicity and 
making campaign promises of ethnic promotion and protection (Byman 2002).  These ethnic 
entrepreneurs tend to force politics from a centrist focus to ethnically based extremism. 
Political parties in divided societies may just mirror the ethnic division initially, but eventually, 
they tend to deepen and widen the differences in the groups (Horowitz 1985).  When societies split along 
ethnic lines, it is much easier for a potential politician to base his/her campaign on issues of ethnicity 
rather than on substantial issues.  Indeed, when major parties begin to centralize their campaigns or seek 
understanding with another group, the chances of inter-ethnic dissension increase and new politicians are 
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likely to arise to take up the ethnic banner.  Mason (2003) shows this occurring in the new post-
independence Sri Lankan parliament between the Tamil and Sinhalese parties. 
 The type of ethnic conflict is an important factor in determining the likelihood of successful win-
win resolutions.  First, if the basis of the conflict is to gain political rights for the minority group, it is 
likely to succeed.  Powerful groups have relatively less to lose by allowing small groups to vote than if 
they were to violently suppress the movement.  Second, ethnic conflict based on minorities attempting to 
gain separate statehood has been peacefully resolved by offering regional autonomy and governance.  
Third, demands for cultural recognition and rights to ancestral lands have been relatively easy to grant.  In 
all of these conflicts, the majority groups are likely to allow the demands, rather than spending a great 
deal of time, energy, and expense to suppress the groups (Gurr 2000).  However, ethnic conflicts based in 
the ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, or elite competition are more difficult to resolve.  The first 
two deal with the physical security of both groups and the weaker groups are unlikely to feel secure.  Elite 
competition deals with ambitions of individual people; inflammatory rhetoric is difficult to squelch.   
In many Western democracies, there is a core of support for particular parties, but there are 
always undecided voters, thus increasing parties’ desires to move to the center to accommodate the 
voters.  With ethnically based political parties, there are few undecided voters.  Basing political parties on 
ethnicity removes the median voters, and the most important factor in an election becomes voter turnout 
(Mitchell 1995).  In fact, in ethnically based political systems, such as historically in Northern Ireland, 
center-based parties receive few votes, since the vast majority of the people mobilize along ethnic lines 
(Mitchell 1995).   
One important exception to this is India.  There, linguistic lines generally were the demarcation of 
the federal states.  In order to gain office at the federal level, the political parties have been successful in 
centering their politics to obtain voters from all regions (Lijphart 1996).  Politicians are not required to 
garner votes from all the states, as in Nigeria, but appealing to only one ethnic/linguistic group would 
create many small parties with minimal percentages in Parliament.  The personalities of Mohandas 
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru (and their family members’ popularity) also heavily influenced Indian 
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politics.  These men (and their families) were heavily supported in post-partition India, since they helped 
bring about independence from Britain.  This may be changing in India since recently a Hindu nationalist 
party gained office by appealing to religion.  They lost power after one term as leaders of the 
Parliamentary coalition, but still wield substantial power in many areas. 
 
Electoral systems and power sharing alternatives 
One way to address ethnic conflict may be the constitutional engineering of the electoral systems.  
However, electoral systems may also play a role in exacerbating ethnic conflict.  When looking at the 
electoral system, there are two dimensions to consider.  The first is how members of the legislature gain 
office—either through plurality/majority vote or through proportional representation.  The other 
dimension is whether the executive branch is parliamentary or presidential.  We can place states in one 
cell of this two-by-two matrix based on these dimensions. 
 
Legislative electoral systems.  Legislative electoral systems fall into three major families, based on how 
votes translate into parliamentary seats.  The first family is the plurality/majority model.  In the plurality 
model, the party that gains the most votes in a district wins that seat.  This plurality system does not 
require that any party receive more than fifty percent of the vote.  The majoritarian electoral model 
demands that one party win more than fifty percent of the vote. 
 As early as the 1950s and 1960s, scholars argued that the plurality model was destined to fail in 
West Africa.  Lewis was one of the first to promote proportional representation (PR) to ensure that the 
government hears the voices of the minorities (1965).  Proportional representation is widely seen as the 
most common way to ensure that the government represents the interests of the minority as well as of the 
majority.  In a PR system, the percentage of votes a party receives in the constituency is the percentage of 
seats the party receives in the legislature. 
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 Electoral systems may also be semi-proportional.  Semi-proportional systems incorporate some 
elements of PR and some of plurality/majority into the electoral system.  For instance, there may be a 
national PR list vote, but also regional plurality votes. 
 These three types of systems have inherent positive and negative attributes.  Divided societies, 
especially those with ethnically based political parties, complicate these attributes.  Scholars have 
proposed several political systems in order to address the issue of democracy in a divided society.   
 
Power-sharing.  There are various definitions of power-sharing.  Sisk defines power-sharing political 
systems as “those that foster governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, major mobilized ethnic 
groups in society” (Sisk 1996, 4).  More specifically, power sharing can be defined as “a set of principles 
that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group or 
segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of 
autonomy over issues of importance to a group” (Sisk 1996, 5).  Lijphart’s version of power sharing is 
consociational, while Horowitz and others favor integrative (pluralist) approaches.  While not the first to 
describe a power-sharing government, Lijphart (1969) proffers consociational politics for divided 
societies.  The model grows out of an in-depth analysis of several continental European states with ethnic 
divisions, such as Belgium and the Netherlands. 
 There are four fundamental requirements for consociational politics.  First, the elites must have 
the power to accommodate their people.  Second, the elites from one group must be willing to work with 
elites from other groups.  Third, the elites must be committed to the cause of democracy and willing to 
work to ensure its survival.  Finally, the elites must accept and understand the problems that will arise in 
the case of fragmentation (Lijphart 1969).  Clearly, elites are more important in this model than the 
populace is.  One type of consociational arrangement used in Venezuela and Colombia (neither divided 
societies) resulted in two major political parties alternating the presidency.  Switzerland has a seven-
person executive made up of members from the ethnic groups.  The Netherlands and post-WWII Austria 
had a small decision-making committee, which, though lacking many formal powers, wielded a great deal 
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of influence.  In Belgium, Catholic and Liberal party leaders learned from the mistakes of their 
predecessors and formed an opposition union in order to prevent a repeat of the civil conflict that had 
allowed foreign forces to dominate Belgium.  A 1943 Lebanese pact dictated that the President of the 
Council and the President of the Republic be of different ethnicities (Lijphart 1969). 
Important factors of a consociational electoral system are the provisions for power sharing and 
the autonomy of cultural groups (Lijphart 2004).  An easy way to ensure these two aspects electorally is 
to have a PR system.  A PR system tends to create a wide range of parties, usually necessitating a grand 
coalition (Reilly 2001, Lijphart 1990).  However, there should also be provisions for a minority veto 
(Lijphart 2002). 
In the three dominant electoral systems described, there are few incentives for politicians to reach 
out to others in a divided society to ensure consociational politics.  In fact, politicians could lose votes 
from their own people if the people believe the politicians are weak.  In a plurality model, if a politician 
were to actively seek out support from another community, the politician would be rejected by his/her 
own people, since in a divided society, support for another group would be perceived as hurting one’s 
own group.  In a proportional representation model, the same would be true.  The politician would be 
rejected by his/her own group and simultaneously unaccepted by the other community.  Consociational 
models are based on the existence of the different groups; an attempt to overcome the differences would 
weaken the position of all the parties.  Without incentives in place to encourage reaching out, politicians 
are much more likely to incite their own people and become ethnic entrepreneurs.  Ethnic entrepreneurs 
tend to ignite a more intense ethnic conflict and push the political spectrum outward from the center to 
extremism and to what have been called centrifugal politics (Reilly 2001).  In such circumstances, 
electoral reform to force the formation of more centrist groups becomes important; this is known as 
centripetal politics (Horowitz 1992). 
 One overwhelming problem with consociationalism is that it encourages further divisions 
between the groups in a state.  In order for consociationalism to work, the groups must always exist (van 
den Berghe 1981).  Centripetal politics, also known as integrative or pluralist politics, is an alternative to 
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consociational politics.  Rather than simply replicating the existing ethnic differences in the legislature, a 
centripetal system is designed to “encourage moderate, centrist forms of political competition, rather than 
the polarising extremes and centrifugal patterns that characterise so many divided societies” (Reilly 2001, 
7).  Thus, the goal shifts from replicating the differences to reducing the salience of the differences.  The 
central aspect of this is to create incentives for politicians to cooperate and accommodate other groups in 
a divided society.  The easiest way to do this is to build functions into the electoral system to force 
politicians in elections to reach out across the division and draw other groups into their electoral base.  
This type of arrangement is also expected to draw elites together and help foster communication between 
the politicians, as well as encouraging vote-sharing or trading deals (Reilly 2001). 
 Three areas need to be addressed in order to move to a centripetal system.  First, there must be 
electoral incentives for candidates to reach across the divide to other groups for support.  Second, there 
must be arenas of bargaining, when candidates from different groups are expected to come together to 
vote pool.  Third, parties are expected to move towards the center to attract a broader range of voters 
(Reilly 2001). 
 In practice, Horowitz (1990) and Reilly (1997) both agree that the alternative vote (AV) or the 
single transferable vote (STV) is the most effective way for a centripetal system to function.  Pre-
independence Papua New Guinea showed the most convincing argument for the AV, although Australia, 
Fiji, Estonia, Ireland, and Northern Ireland all have had preferential voting systems (Reilly 1997).   
In the majoritarian AV system, voters rank their preferences for the position in question for a 
single member district.  If there is no majority when the first preferences are counted, the last place 
candidate is eliminated and the second preferences from these ballots are distributed to the other 
candidates, and so on until there is a majority vote for one candidate.  The purpose of the system is to 
encourage candidates to actively seek out second or third preference votes of people in other ethnic 
groups (Reilly 1997).   
In the PR STV system, voters rank their preferences for the position in question for a 
multimember district.  The first step is to determine a “winning quota.”  For example, if there were 10,000 
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votes cast and 10 seats to fill, the “winning quota” is [10,000 / (10+1)] + 1, or 910 votes.  Any candidate 
who gains this number of votes wins a seat.  If no candidate gains the quota, the last place candidate is 
eliminated and the second preferences from these ballots are distributed to the other candidates, and so on 
until there is a quota-meeting vote for a candidate.  Concurrently, “the “surplus” votes of elected 
candidates (that is, their votes above the quota) are redistributed at a reduced value according to the lower 
preferences on the ballots, until all seats for the constituency are filled” (Reilly 2002, 158).   
AV worked extremely well in Papua New Guinea’s pre-independence parliamentary elections, 
where micro-sized clans and ethnic groups are the norm.  No candidate could campaign only in his ethnic 
group and win a majority of the national vote.  Thus, candidates from different ethnic groups campaigned 
together.  The goal was to have candidates be the first preference of their own ethnic group, and the 
second preference of the other candidates’ ethnic group.  These small coalitions forced candidates to 
appeal to other ethnic groups and campaign as a “second-best” candidate.  Upon independence, in 1975, 
Papua New Guinea changed their system to FPTP, citing the unnecessary complications of the AV system 
and the desire to rid themselves of their colonial vestiges.  In stark contrast to the pre-independence 
elections, in the 1987 parliamentary plurality elections in Papua New Guinea, one candidate won a seat 
with 7.9% of the vote.  Additionally, “in 1987 and 1992, candidates in many Highlands areas were 
virtually restricted to campaigning only in their home base areas due to the very real possibility of 
violence if they ventured beyond their own clan or tribal region” (Reilly 1997, 6).  
 The moderating effect of preferential voting systems was clear in a recent Australian election.  
While it does not qualify as a divided society, Australia has always employed a system of preferential 
voting (AV for the lower house and STV for the Senate).  In the past, politicians used the system to 
ensure that their coalition would win with an overwhelming majority.  This was not the case in 1998 
when Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party came onto the scene.  Hanson’s platform was anti-
immigration, anti-benefits for the Aborigines, and she wanted to end all foreign aid and withdraw from 
the United Nations.  The other political parties rallied against her.  In some regions, the party specifically 
told voters to place Hanson as the last preference (ending decades of having voters place the major 
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opposition as the final preference).  In the first round of preferences, Hanson won a plurality – 36%.  Had 
the system been plurality based, this extremist candidate would have taken the position.  However, since 
the system was preferential, the candidate who came in third in the first round won the seat and Hanson’s 
party only gained one seat in the election (Reilly 2002). 
 MacIver (1999) proposes federalism in multi-ethnic states as a way to mitigate conflict, but this 
would only be useful if the ethnic groups were geographically isolated.  With federalism, political power 
devolves to the local level, allowing groups to have more autonomy.  This tends to work well in India, 
where states are linguistically/ethnically based, but is likely to work less well in states with ethnic 
integration (Lijphart 1996). 
 
Executive electoral systems.  Executive electoral systems may be presidential, semi-presidential, or 
parliamentary.  Verney (1979) described eleven major differences between the presidential system and the 
parliamentary system.  However, scholars now focus on only three main distinctions between the types of 
executive systems.  The first is whom the head of the government is responsible to (the people vs. the 
parliament).  The second is how the head of the government is selected (by the people or by the 
parliament).  The third is how many executives there are (one vs. multiple cabinet members).  
The advantages or disadvantages of particular systems are as important as classifying them.  
There are three main advantages of a presidential system.  First is the fixed term of office, this ensures 
that there are not confidence votes, which lead to instability.  Constant confidence votes led to the failure 
of many governments in the Weimar Republic, France in the Third and Fourth Republics, Sri Lanka, and 
present-day Italy.  Second is the fact that presidentialism may mean greater democracy, since the people 
are voting directly for their president.  In divided or multiethnic states, this gives a heterogeneous ethnic 
constituency.  However, in parliamentary systems with only a few parties, voting for a party shows tacit 
approval of their leader.  This is more complicated in multi-party systems, where the prime minister may 
be chosen because of intra-coalition bargaining.  The third advantage is that presidentialism has an 
inherently more limited government because of separation of powers; each branch has different 
 13
responsibilities (Lijphart 1992).  Montesquieu (1989) was opposed to this concentration of power, fearing 
that it would produce tyranny if one person or group both created and enforced laws. 
There are three advantages of a parliamentary system.  The first is that there is a lack of 
executive-legislative deadlock.  Since the rejection of a major bill is a vote of no confidence, the cabinet 
does not have the option to veto.  The cabinet remains in office until they lose a confidence vote or have 
to call elections.  If no party is more than half of the parliament, this ensures that there is a greater chance 
of cooperation and bargaining in the presentation of laws (Lijphart 1992).  Second is the fact that there is 
no rigid term for parliaments.  The constant affirmation of government ensures that the cabinet is always 
current and focusing on important tasks.  Many Latin American states do not allow reelection of 
presidents; as soon as the president enters office, s/he is a lame duck and has little power.  This also 
avoids presidential succession issues, with the possibility that a potentially unqualified vice president 
succeeds the president.  Third, parliamentary systems tend to produce a more inclusive government (if 
there are more than a few parties).  While the office of president is inherently winner-take-all, the 
presence of a congress mitigates the ability of the president to completely control the government 
(Lijphart 1992).  Nigeria’s Second Republic system attempts to counteract this by demanding that the 
president receive both a plurality of national votes, and at least 25 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the 
19 states, thus ensuring support from other ethnic groups (Horowitz 1990). 
Some see semi-presidentialism as a more favorable option.  They argue that semi-presidentialism 
gives the best of presidential and parliamentary systems.  However, semi-presidentialism does not mean 
that the president and the prime minister are equivalent at the same time.  Instead, the president is more 
powerful when his/her party is the majority in the legislature and the prime minister is more powerful 
when the president’s opposition party is the majority in the legislature (Lijphart 1992). 
  
Explanations 
In this paper, I will examine the ways that electoral systems exacerbate or mitigate ethnic 
conflict.  Electoral systems are the way in which citizens elect political leaders of a state to office.  We 
 14
can examine the ways in which the executive (president/prime minister) and legislative 
(congress/parliament) branches gain office.  Usually, the judicial branch of government is appointed, not 
elected. 
 If certain types of electoral systems can feasibly mitigate ethnic conflict better than others can, 
then these should be the types of systems promulgated for these states.  While electoral systems cannot 
absolutely guarantee better democracy, the fact that the institutions are in place for ethnic cooperation is 
paramount to future peace. 
 
Hypotheses 
H1: In a divided society with ethnically based political parties, the type of government system and 
electoral system will affect the potential for conflict.  In particular, a plurality or majority based electoral 
system in a parliamentary system is expected to generate the highest level of ethnic conflict and 
insecurity.  Presidential systems with proportional representation electoral systems are expected to 
generate the lowest level of ethnic conflict and insecurity.   
This is because in a parliamentary system or coalition, whichever party wins the most seats 
controls the government—both the legislative and executive branches, producing a zero sum game.  
Ethnically based political parties will thus encourage people to vote along ethnic lines, and by employing 
inflammatory comments and platforms, the potential for conflict and insecurity increases.  This demands 
full participation of voters, and those who vote against their ethnic party or do not vote may be targeted 
for recrimination.  This is less likely in a presidential system, since there is a balance of power (assuming 
that the legislative branch has the power to balance the president).  Chart I shows expected outcomes of 
electoral systems in ethnically divided societies.  
 
 15
Chart I: Expected Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies 
Type of executive/ 
How legislature is elected 
Presidential Parliamentary 
PR Conflict not likely Conflict likely 
Plurality/Majoritarian Conflict somewhat likely Conflict most likely 
H2: In a divided society with ethnically based political parties where one ethnicity is more than 
50% of the population, a proportional representation system will not prevent ethnic conflict and 
insecurity. 
Since the proportional representation system is based on the percentage of votes that a party 
receives, if an ethnic group is more than 50% of the population, they will win control of the legislature.  
They will not have to consult with other political parties or ethnic groups in order to rule.  They may 
become entrenched as the ruling party, to the detriment of the other ethnic groups. 
H3: Power-sharing will help prevent ethnic conflict and improve security.   
A power sharing government will allow representation of minorities in the government.  Minority 
representation assures that the government hears the voices of the people, and that issues will be brought 
to attention before conflict erupts. 
 
Operationalization 
Dependent Variable 
This paper seeks to explain ethnic conflict in divided societies.  In many states, the population’s 
ethnicity is malleable and may have no historical basis.  Byman defines ethnic groups as “people bound 
together by a belief in a common kinship and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, language 
and history” (2002, 5).  In other words, ethnicity is what you make of it.  Self-identification is paramount 
to this definition.  Many cases exist of ethnic entrepreneurs fanning the flames of ethnic divides in hopes 
of gaining power.  In places where there are many ethnicities in the same race of people, this is an 
obvious problem.  People may shift their ethnicities, and mobilize along these lines. 
 16
 In states with an immigrant majority, ethnicities are more readily distinguishable and ethnic 
divides tend to follow racial divides.  In the Caribbean, there is an ethnic divide between those descended 
from European colonizers (primarily British), those descended from African slaves, and those brought as 
indentured servants from Asia and Europe (primarily Portugal).  In these places, ethnicity is clearly 
distinguishable, based not only on skin color, but also on language, religion, culture, and even names.  In 
other parts of the world, these ethnic differences are not as distinguishable.  However, in the Caribbean 
and elsewhere in the Americas, ethnicity is distinguishable by many factors. 
 The second feature of this variable is conflict.  Conflict incorporates a broad spectrum of activity.  
Some types of ethnic violence listed by Horowitz (2001) include riots, violent protests, pogroms, feuds, 
lynchings, genocides, terrorist attacks, gang assaults, and ethnic fights.  We can also include strikes (when 
industries are ethnically based), arson, forced migration, and sexual assaults. 
 There are two major types of ethnic conflict: group versus group or group versus government.  
Byman calls an ethnic conflict over when there have been fewer than 100 deaths per year for at least 20 
years.  The use of deaths is justifiable in that, while there are many types of conflict, it is difficult to 
measure riots, sexual assaults, and other forms of violence, and so he uses deaths as a proxy of conflict 
(Byman 2002).  However, in states with small populations, this measurement is not as useful, since if we 
use this to measure the magnitude of violence it would be proportionally much higher than in states with 
high populations. 
For this study, I will use the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset.  The MAR dataset includes data 
on inter-communal conflict from the 1940s through 2000, both the type and level of violence.  MAR 
measures political discrimination, extent of political restrictions, economic disadvantages, cultural 
discrimination, inter-communal violence, group protest activity, anti-regime rebellion, and government 
repression.  It also includes type of government from 1945 through 2000 (MAR 1986). 
As this paper focuses on lower intensity conflict, I will define ethnic violence in terms of riots, 
violent protests, physical assault, property destruction, ethnically motivated strikes, and forced migration.   
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Explanatory Variable   
Electoral systems are distinguishable based on the type of voting system, type of legislature, 
and/or manner of presidential election.  Electoral systems generally fit into one of the three electoral 
families (majority/plurality, PR, or semi-PR) described above, and should fit into one of the four cells 
categorizations  As control variables, I will consider economic conditions in the cases such as level of 
unemployment, GDP per capita, economic differences between the groups, and other economic factors.   
 
Methodology 
 This research project is a qualitatively and quantitatively based case study of Guyana in 
comparative perspective.  I will examine the implications of each political system concerning 
majority/minority interactions and the chances of majority tyranny.  Furthermore, I will examine 
examples of power sharing as they occur in the case studies.  I will make recommendations based on the 
ethnic composition of the divided society as to which power sharing arrangements are likely to improve 
the chances of decreased ethnic conflict. 
 The first section of the project is an in-depth case study of Guyana.  Guyana has a parliamentary 
system in which the president is the leader of the party controlling the parliament.  S/he then selects a 
prime minister.  In Guyana, the Indo-Guyanese make up half of the population, Afro-Guyanese make up 
just over a third of the population.  Thus, they violate Lijphart’s first condition for power sharing to work.  
In fact, Guyana has had three electoral systems since the 1940s.  They had a plurality-based parliamentary 
system for several elections in the 1940s and 1950s.  In the 1960s, there was one election based on 
proportional representation before an Afro-Guyanese leader seized power.  Since 1992, there have been 
three national level elections, with another election due by winter of 2006.  The current system, in place 
in its current configuration since 2001, is a mixed one, with a single statewide list-based PR system 
electing forty members of parliament, and regional constituencies electing the remaining twenty-five via 
PR.  I look at the change in the level of conflict in Guyana over time to see if the change in electoral 
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systems affected it.  Additionally, I examine the level of conflict before and after the party schism that 
divided the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) into ethnic parties.   
Other divided societies, for example Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, Fiji, and Lebanon will be 
examined less rigorously using the MAR dataset to see if there is a correlation between type of electoral 
system and level of conflict.  I analyze this group of divided societies to see if there is support for the 
above hypotheses.  The differing percentages of ethnic groups, as well as their electoral experiences and 
economic conditions, should shed some light on the impact of the electoral system on ethnic conflict.   
My data sources include secondary and historical analyses, election reports, and interviews with 
people who have worked with Guyana in various capacities.  These people have worked as election 
monitors, democracy experts, and conflict resolution experts. 
 
Guyana Case Study 
Historical Review 
Pre-independence.  Guyana suffered through colonization of the Dutch, the French, and, finally, the 
British.  They gained independence from the British in 1966.  When Europeans first arrived in the New 
World, Amerindian tribes, primarily the Carib and the Arawak, populated Guyana.  Initially, the Dutch 
traded near the coast with the Amerindians, but eventually they moved inland and began plantations.  The 
Dutch used Guyana primarily for sugar production, but they also grew coffee, indigo, and tobacco.  Sugar 
is now the second largest agricultural product.  As a primary product producer Guyana’s economy is 
contingent upon world prices and economic circumstances around the world. 
After it became clear that they could not enslave the Amerindians, the Dutch and later the British 
turned to Africa.  From the beginning of plantations until the abolition of slavery in 1833, they brought 
thousands of slaves, although the exact number is unknown.  After the British banned slavery in 1833, the 
freed Afro-Guyanese slaves refused to work for their former masters regardless of the wages, and moved 
into the urban regions where they became civil servants.  To attract workers, the British began an 
indentured servant project.  Initially, they brought indentured servants from the Madeira Islands of 
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Portugal and from China, but these workers could not work in the tropics and soon these ethnic groups 
moved into the merchant sectors.  The next source for the British was India, where they were already 
firmly entrenched.  Indentured servants from India came in huge numbers until 1917, when the practice 
was officially ended.  The Indians were accustomed to the type of climate found in Guyana, and were able 
to work on the plantations.  The current population of Guyana is 50% Indian, 36% African, 7% 
Amerindian, and 7% other groups (CIA World Factbook).   In general, the Afro-Guyanese have lived in 
the urban areas and dominated the bureaucracy and security forces.  The Portuguese and Chinese have 
excelled in the merchant sector.  The Indo-Guyanese have dominated the rural areas and agricultural 
sectors.  Some Afro-Guyanese remained in the rural areas, but they were a minority.  There was also 
mixed race mining of bauxite, but the Afro-Guyanese tended to dominate the sector.   
 The relationships between the ethnic groups have been trying since the beginning.  The Dutch and 
British utilized Amerindians to find, to capture, and to return escaped African slaves.  The Afro-Guyanese 
resented the Amerindians for this.  The Afro-Guyanese also resented the Indo-Guyanese, whom the Afro-
Guyanese felt were responsible for their diminished bargaining position on the plantations. 
 Ethnic groups in Guyana have always been separated.  The voluntary associations and the labor 
unions were the beginning of the independence movement.  During the 1930s, the two major labor unions 
instigated strikes and other public dissension in Guyana in order to attract British attention.  They 
demanded universal adult suffrage.  The British refused, but did begin to lower the voting requirements, 
which made little difference initially, but eventually suffrage increased throughout the 1940s.  Suffrage 
extended from 11,000 people in 1944 to 59,000 people in 1947 (Premdas 1996).  Ethnically based 
associations began the collaboration of peoples necessary for the overthrow of a colonial master.  The 
Indian and African groups, making up the largest segment of the population, “recognized that economic 
conditions were inextricably bound up with the colonial political order” (Premdas 1996, 29).  They began 
demanding wider suffrage and abolition of voting restrictions. 
During the 1947 elections, when Guyanese were voting for their colonial legislature (which was 
dominated by the British and afforded them no real power), Cheddi Jagan (an Indo-Guyanese who would 
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later become the first president) had realized the people were unequivocally voting along racial lines.  In 
order to ensure victory for his new political party, the PPP, Jagan sought out an Afro-Guyanese running 
mate, Forbes Burnham, to capture both the Indian and African votes.  The PPP continued to strive for a 
Socialist state; they won 18 of 24 seats in the 1953 election.  This power arrangement created a time of 
unparalleled ethnic harmony in Guyana (Premdas 1996).  However, when the British realized that the PPP 
were socialists, they suspended to constitution to block Jagan’s policies and sent warships to remove the 
government, likely at the behest of the United States government and business interests in Guyana 
(Griffith 1997).   
The British jailed Jagan and Burnham separately.  During their forced separation, differences in 
style and leadership goals became apparent, and the PPP split into two parties in 1955.  The parties were 
known for a while as PPP Jagan and PPP Burnham, but eventually Burnham renamed his party the People 
National Congress (PNC) (Carroll and Pastor 1993).  Most unfortunately, the ethnic solidarity 
disappeared. 
After the party split in 1955, each subsequent election ratcheted up the violence in the state.  
According to Premdas, in Guyana, “each succeeding election campaign raise[d] the level of intergroup 
distrust and fear to a new high point until, after several elections, inter-community differences become so 
intolerable that continued mutual coexistence among the sub-groups in the society [was] close to 
impossible” (1996, 59).   
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Table I: Election Outcomes 
Source: Ishmael 2005 
Year Party Seats Percentage of 
popular vote won 
Voter Turnout 
PPP 9 47.50% 
PNC 3 25.48% 
 
1957 
Others 2 N/A 
 
55.8% 
PPP 20 42.6% 
PNC 11 41% 
 
1961 
UF 4 16.1% 
 
89.4% 
PPP 24 42.6% 
PNC 22 41% 
 
1964 
UF 7 12.4% 
 
97% 
 
 
 
Table I shows the election outcomes from 1957, 1961, and 1964.  In the 1957 election, the PPP 
won nine out of 13 seats with voter turnout at 55.8% of registered voters.  In 1961, the PPP won 20 of 35 
seats, while the PNC won 11 seats with voter turnout at 89.4%.  In 1964, the PPP won 24 seats, while the 
PNC won 22 seats with voter turnout at 97% (Ishmael 2005).   
Premdas interviewed several people who were registered to vote, but did not, in the 1957 election.  
These people stated that in 1957 “they had been psychologically unable to bring themselves to vote for 
either Dr. Jagan or Mr. Burnham, since this would necessarily entail disrupting the relatively peaceful 
inter-ethnic harmony that existed between African and Indian communities at that time” (Premdas 1996, 
62).   
After the FPTP 1957 election, the political parties began a campaign to support the idea of 
apanjaat (vote for your own kind) politics.  Because of the pervasive apanjaat policies, the people were 
forced to vote for their own ethnicity, or face violent reprisals.  According to Premdas, if a person was 
identified as having voted for the “wrong” party, “activists applied various forms of pressure, including 
open attacks on the persons or homes of the uncommitted, as a means of persuading them to behave 
according to the tenets of Apanjaat” (1996, 52).  Voter turnout rose tremendously from 1957 to 1964 
because of this pressure (Carter Center 1993).   
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From 1957 to 1963, under FPTP, only constituencies with a relatively equal distribution of the 
major ethnic groups suffered the consequences of apanjaat.  The effect of turning from FPTP to PR for 
the 1964 election was that the apanjaat system immediately spread throughout the entire country.  
Grassroots canvassers spread this system by visiting many homes within six months of the elections, and 
urged the people to vote for their own kind.  During this time, political parties continued to co-opt 
voluntary associations to ensure that the constituents were in line with apanjaat.  Political parties 
accomplished this co-option by putting voluntary association leaders in high-ranking positions in the 
party, and by having high-ranking members of the political parties installed as leaders of the voluntary 
associations (Premdas 1996). 
 
Analysis: Politically inspired ethnic conflict 
Soon after the PPP gained office in 1961, the United Front (UF) (a party mainly consisting of the 
well-off European, Chinese, and mixed Guyanese), which had gained four seats, began a destabilization 
campaign in order to show that the PPP was unable to govern.  The Afro-Guyanese dominant civil service 
and other Afro-Guyanese associations joined the campaign by striking and protesting against the PPP.  
This strike turned for the worst on February 16, 1962 with arson and violence in Georgetown.  The toll of 
this violence was “five men killed, eighty injured, and over $11.5 million dollars (British West Indies 
currency) worth of property destroyed in the business center of Georgetown” (Premdas 1996, 100).  The 
PPP government was unable to reign in the violence during this time, likely because the Afro-Guyanese 
dominated military and police were unwilling to respond.  The British were called in to help reprieve the 
violence (Horowitz 1985).   
The following year, the PNC called on the Afro-Guyanese unions to strike against the 
government to weaken the PPP’s position.  Since the Afro-Guyanese dominated the civil service and 
armed service sectors, this was devastating.  The goal of the strike was to remove Jagan from office, since 
the Afro-Guyanese refused to accept him as the President.  Secretly funded by the CIA, the AFL-CIO of 
the United States funneled money to the African unions in an attempt to remove the Socialist government 
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from office.  Eventually, the sugar companies, oil importers, food transporters, and even the 
police/military refused to do their jobs (Premdas 1996).  Communal violence broke out, the British were 
pressured to intervene and sent troops in to quell the violence (Carter Center 1993).     
Given the debilitating effect the strike had on the PPP, the PNC and UF were encouraged that 
more striking would further weaken the government.  The goal was the replacement of the PPP in 
government by the PNC/UF.  Premdas (1996) notes that strikes were easy to launch against the PPP in 
Georgetown because the vast majority of Indo-Guyanese lived in rural areas.  The Afro-Guyanese 
dominated civil service, police, and military forces were based in Georgetown, as well as the generally 
well-off supporters of the UF.  A strike of the civil service shut down the government, and the police were 
unwilling to attempt to force them back to work. 
For 80 days in 1963, ethnic violence reached a peak, law and order was destroyed, and the state 
was essentially in civil war.  The impetus was the introduction of a labor relations bill into parliament.  
Essentially, the same bill had been proposed in parliament in 1953, but in 1963 the political climate had 
changed and the opposition parties opposed the bill because it centralized power in the Ministry of Labor 
and because the opposition had not been consulted.  However according to Burnham, the opposition to the 
labor relations bill was not the causa belli, but the casus belli, of the strike; that is, not the cause of war, 
but the opportunity for it (Chase 1964). 
According to Premdas, the cause of the 1963 strike was the same as the 1962 strike: to 
demonstrate “the inability of the Jagan regime to govern Guyana, and to postpone independence, change 
the electoral system, call new elections, and ultimately remove the PPP government from power.  In sum, 
the PNC and UF’s distrust of a PPP regime in independent Guyana precipitated violence and sabotage 
against the Jagan government” (1996, 105).  In general, Afro-Guyanese workers and not the Indo-
Guyanese workers participated in the strike.  Because of the ethnic composition of the strikers, it is clear 
that ethnicity was at the forefront of the strike.   
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After the strikes, the UF and the PNC, as well as the US, pressured the British to allow PR 
elections in 1964.  In response to these pressures, the UK changed the Guyanese electoral system, making 
it the only colony in the Commonwealth that did not have a FPTP system (Horowitz 1985). 
During the 1963 strike, the Jagan government was unable to get assistance from any international 
states other than Communist Cuba and Soviet regimes.  When Cuban and Soviet shipments arrived 
carrying food and oil, rumors flew of a communist takeover, which led to increased ethnic violence, with 
Indo-Guyanese being attacked and killed in Georgetown, while the same occurred in rural areas to Afro-
Guyanese.  Other forms of violence, including bombings, became common.  Essentially, this was civil 
war (Premdas 1996). 
The violence was ended after eighty days when the British government was able to mediate the 
dispute.  The labor relations bill was thrown out of parliament, but for three weeks after this the violence 
continued, which is further evidence that the strike was not a result of the bill but instead intended to 
destabilize the government (Premdas 1996). 
During the mediation of this dispute, the British government essentially gave the opposition all 
that they demanded while denying Jagan any of his requests.  The British conceded on four points: new 
elections would be held; independence would be postponed; PR would be used; and the voting age would 
not be decreased and would remain at 21.  The concession of these four points essentially guaranteed that 
the opposition (a PNC/UF coalition) would win the new election.  While these concessions were able to 
end the violence of 1963, they set the stage for the following year’s problems.  The United States 
encouraged the British government’s refusal to grant any of the PPP concessions (Premdas 1996). 
In response, in January 1964, the PPP organized a reaction against the decisions of the mediation.  
Jagan called a strike of the sugar industry and mobilized a march to the capital.  The strikes did not end 
until July 24, 1964.  Ethnic violence was again at civil war standards.  Estimated destruction was “total 
deaths range from 150 to 200, injuries from 900 to 2,000, homes destroyed from 1,400 to 2,000, displaced 
persons from 10,000 to 20,000, and physical property damage from G$5 million to G$20 million” 
(Premdas 109, 1996). In May, a state of emergency was declared (which lasted through independence in 
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1966), British troops were brought in, and security was placed in the hands of the British governor.  With 
the sugar workers striking, violent confrontation spread throughout the countryside.  The deaths, violence, 
displacement, and property damage solidified the split between the groups, with calls for secession on 
both sides (Premdas 1996). 
Elections under PR were held in December 1964.  The PPP won 24 seats of 53, the PNC won 22 
seats, and the UF won seven seats.  The PNC and the UF joined a coalition, and with 29 of 53 seats in the 
legislature, were able to run the government from 1964 to 1968.  Independence was granted on May 26, 
1966 while the state of emergency was still in place.  Because of the strength of the police/military forces 
and the presence of British troops during the continued state of emergency, the PPP was unable to strike 
or cause any disruptions during this time.   
 
Post-independence.  In 1968, the PNC began rigging elections and a 28-year period of PNC authoritarian 
rule ensued.  Violence against Indo-Guyanese and eventually Afro-Guyanese spread throughout Guyana.  
The state violence maintained the power of the PNC; it also gave a veil of impunity to the police to 
plunder the populace for their own gains (Premdas 1996).  A third of the population fled, mainly to North 
America.  Political space disappeared.  During Burnham’s rule, groups were not granted any political 
space and any movements against the government were met with force, since the PNC controlled the 
military sector.   
Burnham died in 1985.  During his years as president, the political and economic situations 
deteriorated significantly.  He changed electoral rules to the mixed PR system to ensure his continued 
electoral success and changed the constitution.  He improved relations with the USSR, China, and Cuba, 
nationalized and consolidated control of major businesses in Guyana, and probably ordered the 
assassination of the popular political opposition leader Walter Rodney of the Working People’s Alliance 
in 1980.  The economy also took a turn for the worst during Burnham’s rule, with the oil crisis of the 
1970s increasing prices and the terms of trade deteriorating significantly.  Given their strong socialist 
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leanings, the country also had a poor relationship with bilateral and multilateral donors (Carter Center 
1993).   
Burnham died in August 1985 and was succeeded by Desmond Hoyte, who was the first vice 
president and prime minister.  Elections were due later that year; coupled with domestic pressures for 
reforms, Hoyte realized that some concessions were necessary.  He eliminated postal voting and put 
restrictions on overseas voting.  Burnham had fraudulently used both of these voting methods to capture 
elections (Carter Center 1993).  After the 1985 elections, the PPP and four other main opposition parties 
formed the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD) in order to push for reforms.  Specifically, they 
wanted “the creation of a totally independent Elections Commission with authority over all aspects of the 
electoral process, the counting of ballots at polling places, restricting the military to barracks on election 
day, and the presence of international observers” (Carroll and Pastor 1993, 165).   
 
Guyana since 1992.  In the early 1990s, Hoyte faced pressures from international and domestic actors to 
democratically reform the country.  Because of this, he invited the Commonwealth Secretariat to monitor 
the election.  Jagan was not certain of the impartiality of the Commonwealth and invited the Carter Center 
to also observe the elections.  Jagan was able to convince the Hoyte government to agree (Carter Center 
1993).  
After the Cold War, it was no longer necessary for the United States to support the PNC 
government in Guyana.  According to Premdas (1996), the Carter Center was one of the main forces in 
persuading the government to hold transparent elections, which finally occurred on October 5, 1992.  In 
late 1990, with the PCD pressuring Hoyte, he began some minimal reforms of the electoral system, but 
many problems remained, most notably the flawed voters list and the structure of the Elections 
Commission (Carter Center 1993). 
Given the problems, however, election-monitoring groups agreed that the actual 1992 election 
was clean by their standards and the PNC withdrew from power in favor of the PPP.  During this election, 
53 of 65 seats were directly elected in PR (party list), while the other 12 were elected by regional 
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councils.  Since it was the first competitive election under this system, I consider this the first instance of 
the mixed PR system. 
While for the most part the voting was calm and peaceful, in Georgetown, Linden, and New 
Amsterdam, “violence, intimidation, and attempts to manipulate the process did occur” (Carter Center 
1993, 40).  A siege of the Elections Commission headquarters in Guyana nearly led to the collapse of the 
election.  The siege was by “a violent and angry crowd claiming disenfranchisement” (Carter Center 
1993, 40).  Most of these were members or supporters of the PNC.  Violence spread into the business 
sector of Georgetown, resulting in two deaths and substantial damage.  In early afternoon, more than 
1,500 protestors were at the election headquarters.  The Guyanese and UNDP technicians in the building 
were forced to flee in the midst of the stoning of the building and attempts to storm the building (Carroll 
and Pastor 1993).  The Chairman of the Elections Commission agreed to allow these protestors to vote at 
the headquarters.  Their votes were not counted, but officials determined that less than a quarter of them 
were registered voters.  Later in the day, armed officers arrived, and the protestors dispersed (Carter 
Center 1993). 
In Linden, violence also broke out.  Crowds claiming to have registered but unable to find their 
names on the voters list attacked six polling stations and the regional office of the Elections 
Commissions.  “Several of these polling stations were stoned and elections officials were intimidated and 
assaulted, furniture overturned and destroyed and, in some cases, ballot boxes removed” (Carter Center 
1993, 41).   
In New Amsterdam, a crowd overwhelmed a polling place, but the potential violence was 
squelched when officials allowed them to vote and placed their votes in a “special container” (Carter 
Center 1993).  Later in the same day, this group stormed Jagan’s office, and widespread looting occurred 
in Georgetown for several days (IFES 2002). 
Tallying was done at the polling stations, and a “Quick Count” was utilized by observers to 
ensure a proper count.  As a result, Jagan was declared the winner rather quickly.  Opposition parties and 
international observers accepted the results, although the PNC continued to insist that all the prior 
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elections during their rule were free and fair.  While the election did end the system of non-democratic 
ethnic rule, the PPP did not need to include other parties in their rule, since they got a majority in 
Parliament.  The situation switched from non-democratic Afro-Guyanese domination to democratic Indo-
Guyanese domination.  Given the violence of the dictatorship, and the complete distrust of both sides, 
Jagan was in no political position to form a grand coalition.  The parliamentary seats were dispersed as 
such: PPP/Civic 36, PNC 26, WPA 2, and UF 1, with Jagan inaugurated on October 9, and the new 
parliament convening on December 17, 1992 (Carter Center 1993). 
Jagan died in March 1997 and was succeeded by Prime Minister Samuel Hinds, who invited the 
Commonwealth to observe the 1997 election.  There were 10 parties contesting the 1997 election, and 
there was some discontent from the smaller parties (Commonwealth 1998).  The Disciplined Forces, the 
police, defense force, prison service, and the national service voted peacefully on December 10 
(Commonwealth 1998).  
The actual voting on December 15 was not problematic; however, the tallying process was.  The 
tallying process continued until early in the morning on December 19.  In the meantime, both the PPP and 
the PNC had declared victory.  Elections officials decided to meet with the heads of the parties on the 
evening of December 16.  However, “shortly before these meetings a street demonstration resulted in tear 
gas and shots being fired.  It was reported that 11 people had been wounded, some of whom were 
hospitalized” (Commonwealth 1998, 27). 
The PNC did not accept the initial declaration of tallying process, and demanded a recount, 
especially in Region 4, which they announced the morning of December 19.  A few hours later, the 
Elections Commission announced that based on the votes counted, the PPP had won, and the votes left to 
be counted could not surmount the divide.  As a result, the Chairman of the Elections Commission 
declared the PPP to be the winner.  Some of the “opposition groups had already gone to the High Court of 
Guyana to ask for an injunction to prevent the continuation of the tally of the votes and to ask that the 
ballots from all over the country be recounted” (Commonwealth 1998, 28).  This injunction was not 
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granted in time, and later that afternoon Janet Jagan was inaugurated as president with only 90% of vote 
counting completed.   
There was an outbreak of riots in response to this perceived theft of office; PNC supporters 
essentially took over Georgetown to show the country that the PPP could never have won the elections.  
The same type of rioting and looting which occurred after the 1992 election occurred again (IFES 2002).  
Violence against Indo-Guyanese occurred; and since they controlled the civil service, the military forces, 
and essentially Georgetown, the PNC was able to force the government into negotiations, mediated by 
Caricom, and called the Herdmanston Accord (Premdas 2002).  The PNC refused to accept the result of 
the election, and boycotted Parliament during the violent demonstrations (Carter Center 2002).  The PNC 
could not fathom that the number of Indo-Guyanese in the rural areas could counter the number of Afro-
Guyanese in the urban areas.   
Janet Jagan resigned in 1999 due to poor health, and after Samuel Hinds temporarily resigned 
from his position as Prime Minister to remove himself from the line of succession, Bharrat Jagdeo 
became the President.  As a result of the Hermanston Accord, and new legislative elections were 
scheduled for 2001 (a year early).  Significant reforms were planned to the constitution and the Elections 
Commission.  The most significant change in the Elections Commission was that it was made a 
permanent secretariat, renamed the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM).  GECOM had a very tight 
schedule in order to meet the elections deadline of the Herdmanston Accord, which was further hampered 
by the Parliament’s failure to pass key reforms until November 2000 (Carter Center 2002). 
The key reform dealing with the electoral system was that all members of the Parliament would 
be directly elected, ridding the system of the Regional Councils.  The system was finalized in February 
2001, when it was decided that there would be 65 members of Parliament—40 elected in the national PR 
list and 25 elected in the regional PR lists.  GECOM was forced to move the election date from January 
until March 19, 2001.  They also had to revise and verify the voters list and produce and distribute the 
national ID cards (Carter Center 2002). 
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In January 2001, the High Court finally resolved the cases arising from the 1997 elections.  The 
High Court ruled “the 1997 elections ‘vitiated,’ because the statutory requirements of using voter 
registration cards violated the Constitution” (Carter Center 2002, 17).  In practice, this meant the 
GECOM’s actions to print and distribute voter ID cards for the 2001 elections was also unconstitutional, 
and the entire practice had to be ended and revamped.  This was remedied by allowing the identification 
cards to be only one form of acceptable identification, instead of as in the 1997 elections when it was the 
only acceptable identification.  The Court also decided that in order to ensure law and order, the PPP 
government was to remain legally in office until the March 31, 2001, giving GECOM a firm deadline.  
The PPP government’s mandate expired on January 17.  During the interim period, the government was 
restrained from any political and legislative actions beyond day-to-day operations (Carter Center 2002). 
On Election Day 2001, only a few major irregularities occurred, and these were not enough to 
doubt the integrity of the election.  However, there were many problems with the voter ID card.  In some 
cases, people without cards were allowed to vote, and in others they were not.  As the day progressed, the 
streets of Georgetown were becoming tense, and there were many PNC supporters who believed they 
were deliberately being disenfranchised (Carter Center 2002).   
One of the medium-term observers of the elections was David Pottie (2005).  He was stationed in 
a town on the Surinamese border.  He noted no major problems in the election, which drew a high 
turnout.  However, after the election, he was unable to return to Georgetown because of the roadblocks.  
He instead went to New Amsterdam and met up with other observers.  After careful deliberation (since 
the police forces are dominated by Afro-Guyanese), they presented themselves to the police and returned 
to Georgetown with a police escort.   
The tallying process of the 2001 election was not nearly as problematic that of the 1997 election, 
and the observers saw few problems, and none that were significant enough to doubt the integrity of the 
election.  The smaller parties, who were not allowed to be present at the tabulation of the votes, disputed 
the counting methods.  On March 23, 2001, GECOM issued the results of the elections.  There was a 
problem in Region 4, and when the results were retabulated (with no major complaints), the results were 
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Guyana Action Party/Working People’s Alliance (GAP/WPA) 2, PNC/R 27 (41.9%), PPP/C 34 (52.9%), 
ROAR 1, and UF 1 (Carter Center 2002). 
The PNC continued to refute the results, and members began demonstrating, claiming that they 
had been disenfranchised.  One of the PNC/R Election Commissioners was attacked for agreeing with the 
official results.  Buxton also experienced unrest, and some businesses and schools stayed closed in 
Georgetown because of it.  Within hours of the release of the official results, a PNC/R candidate 
petitioned for an injunction to prevent Jagdeo from being inaugurated.  During the hearings, protestors 
gathered outside.  On March 31, the judge dismissed the injunction, clearing the way for Jagdeo’s 
confirmation (Carter Center 2002). 
For several weeks, the country remained tense.  There were multiple protests, which occasionally 
turned violent, as well as roadblocks in Georgetown and other areas of the country.  Hoyte declared his 
intention to escalate the protests and a PNC/R rally led to an outbreak of violence.  A talk show host’s 
comments led to arson in Georgetown (destroying eight buildings).  Additionally, a woman was murdered 
near the PPP/C headquarters.  Beginning April 24, Hoyte met with Jagdeo to reach agreements on several 
topics, and this series of meetings seems to have ended the violence (Carter Center 2002).  In ending the 
violence, Jagdeo negotiated with the PNC leader and agreed to constitutional reform and to adding 
minority rights and unofficial power sharing (Premdas 2001).  These reforms have yet to occur, with 
elections scheduled for 2006. 
The 2001 election again resulted in PPP dominance in the legislature and Jagdeo was reaffirmed 
as President “triggering, almost as an uncanny repetition, a series of riots, shootings, and murders which 
assumed an ethno-racial character” (Premdas 2001, 25).  Additionally, after the election, a prolonged 
court battle waged between the PPP and the PNC over technical details of the elections (IFES 2002).   
After significant debate about changing the number of MPs elected in the geographic PR 
elections, in June 2005, the PPP tabled a bill that would freeze the number of seats allocated to the 
geographical PR election process at 25.  The opposition was infuriated, but could not stop its adoption, 
since the PPP has an absolute majority in Parliament. 
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On July 7, 2005, the government tabled a bill (passed July 14, 2005) that would make voter 
registration continuous, instead of just every seven years.  This was intended to help clean up the 2001 
voter registration list, which the government so far intends to use as the basis of the 2006 voter 
registration list.  Although the opposition claims that they support the idea of continuous registration, they 
are upset that so many of their ideas have not been implemented.  The opposition wants to start a new 
voter registration list, since they claim that there were so many problems with the 2001 list.  They also 
want to implement biometric measures, i.e. fingerprints, as a part of the voter registry to avoid improper 
and multiple voting.  The opposition also claims that the PPP is circumventing and undermining 
GECOM. 
 In the past few years, as drug eradication efforts have worked in Colombia, Venezuela, and 
elsewhere in South America, Guyana has become a major shipment point for illicit drugs to the United 
States.  With trafficking come traffickers, their money, and their guns.  Given the historical 
contentiousness that occurs in the lead up and aftermath of an election in Guyana, and the current 
opposition grievances against the government, it is reasonable to expect that the 2006 Guyanese elections 
will also have violence.  The number and force of weapons available to the people has increased 
dramatically in the last few years, and this could make any problems associated with the 2006 elections 
even more dangerous. 
 
Analysis and summary of the case study 
There have been three electoral systems in Guyana’s recent history.  The first electoral system 
was the pre-independence first-past-the-post elections.  The elections that took place under this system 
occurred in 1957 and 1961.  Table II shows the amount of damage caused during outbreaks of ethnic 
conflict in Guyana.  The strikes of 1962 and 1963 took place while Jagan was president, elected via 
FPTP.  
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Table II: Level of violence in Guyana at electoral moments 
Sources: Premdas 1996, Carter Center 1993, 2001 
 Strikes Arson/property damage Injuries/deaths Government 
repression 
FPTP 1962: PNC/UF  
1963: PNC/UF 
1962: $11.5 million 
 
 
1962: 80 injured, 5 
deaths 
1963: urban 
beatings, rural 
massacres 
None 
reported 
PR 1964: PPP  
 
Homes destroyed: 1,400 – 
2,000; displaced persons 
10,000-20,000; property 
damage: $5-$20 million 
Injuries: 900-2,000 
Deaths: 150-200 
Government 
repression 
of PPP 
Mixed PR 1992: PNC Rioting and looting in 
Georgetown; Jagan’s office 
stormed 
Election officials 
assaulted 
No major 
repression 
noted 
Mixed PR 1997: PNC Rioting and looting in 
Georgetown 
11 wounded, 
violence against 
Indo-Guyanese 
Some use of 
force and 
arrests 
Mixed PR 2001: PNC 8 buildings destroyed 1 high ranking 
election official 
assaulted, other 
election officials 
assaulted, 2 deaths 
None 
apparent 
 
The second type of system was PR; the elections under this type of system occurred in 1964; this 
election chose the party which would lead the country into independence in 1966.  The strikes in 1964 
were led by Jagan while he was still President in response to the decision to change the system to PR.  
While both the FPTP strikes of 1962 and 1963, as well as the PR strikes of 1964 were highly destructive, 
in terms of personal violence, the 1964 PR strikes were the worst.  After the PNC/UF coalition took 
power in 1964, they began to repress the PPP and their members.  This is the only major instance of such 
repression. 
Since Burnham’s death in 1985 and the return to democracy in 1992, there has been a mixed PR 
system, with members of Parliament (MPs) elected from a national list, as well as from a regional list.  
The current parliament in Guyana has 65 members.  Forty are elected through nationwide closed PR lists.  
The remaining 25 are elected through constituency-based closed PR lists.  One major flaw with closed list 
PR in large constituencies is that there is limited accountability to the people.  The populace does not 
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have a legislator responsible to their needs—the people do not know whom they can contact from the 
nationwide list.  However, since there are multiple constituency legislators, the people also are not aware 
of whom to contact from the regional list.  The urban constituencies are underrepresented in terms of 
population.  Alternatively, the rural constituencies are so physically large that they also have 
representation problems.  
The strikes since the return to democracy in 1992 have not been nearly as violent as those of the 
1960s.  However, it is important to note that the violence still has existed.  Property damage through arson 
and/or riots/looting has occurred in all three elections since 1992.  The level of personal violence, 
although there have only been two deaths, seems to be escalating since 1992.  In terms of destruction and 
personal violence, the PR related strikes of 1964 were by far the worst, followed by the FPTP strikes of 
1962 and 1963, then the mixed PR strikes of the 1990s and 2001.   
According to the MAR data in Table III, in Guyana from 1990 to 2000, there was little violent 
intercommunal conflict.  The MAR data measures acts of harassment, political agitation, sporadic violent 
attacks, anti-group demonstrations, communal rioting, and communal warfare.  Only acts of harassment 
were noted for the ten-year period—in 1992, and in 1997-2000.  These periods coincide with the 
elections, with the 1997 election creating a longer period of discontent.  Full data on all three measures of 
violence listed in Table III are not available before 1985.  However, MAR also shows that, for all the 
years with data since 1970, there has been intercommunal conflict.  Therefore, even if the conflict did not 
turn violent, it still existed (MAR 2003). 
 
 35
Table III: MAR data in Guyana: 1985-2000  
Source: MAR 2003 
Data for Guyana is incomplete before 1985, and MAR does not extend past 2000 
Year Intercommunal Conflict Protest Activity Government Repression 
1985 N/A Verbal opposition N/A 
1986 N/A Verbal opposition N/A 
1987 N/A Verbal opposition N/A 
1988 N/A Verbal opposition N/A 
1989 N/A Verbal opposition N/A 
1990 None evident Verbal opposition N/A 
1991 None evident Verbal opposition N/A 
1992 Acts of harassment Scattered acts 
symbolic resistance 
N/A 
1993 None evident Scattered acts 
symbolic resistance 
N/A 
1994 None evident Verbal opposition N/A 
1995 None evident Verbal opposition N/A 
1996 None evident Verbal opposition Property confiscation or 
destruction/force against 
protestors 
1997 Acts of harassment Small demonstrations Arrested a few members 
of groups/Saturation of 
police or military/force 
against protestors 
1998 Acts of harassment Small demonstrations Arrested a few members 
of groups/Saturation of 
police or military/force 
against protestors 
1999 Acts of harassment Verbal opposition Arrested a few members 
of groups/Saturation of 
police or military/force 
against protestors 
2000 Acts of harassment Verbal opposition None evident 
 
 
 The MAR also measures protest activity since 1985.  Protest categories are verbal opposition, 
symbolic resistance, small demonstrations, medium demonstrations, and large demonstrations.  Each year 
has had some protest activity.  In 1997-1998, coincident with the elections, protest activities were at the 
level of small demonstrations, defined as “demonstrations, riotes, strikes, and/or riots, total participation 
of less than 10,000” (MAR 2003, 89).  In 1992-1993, coincident with the elections, protest activity was at 
the level of scattered acts of symbolic resistance, defined as “sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, 
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symbolic destruction of property or political organizing activity on a substantial scale”(MAR 2003, 88-
89).  In all the other years, protest activity was at the level of verbal opposition (MAR 2003). 
 Additionally, the MAR lists various government repression from 1996 onwards.  Guyana only 
scores on a few measures in these years.  In 1997-1999, the government arrested a few members of group 
members who were engaged in collective action.  In 1996, the government engaged in property 
confiscation or destruction of “group members in both kinds of circumstances engaged and not engaged 
in collective action, or in ambiguous situations, for example when it is not clear from source materials 
whether repressive action was provoked or not” (MAR 2003, 94).  This was the only year that the 
Guyanese government scored on this account.  From 1997 to 1999, the government engaged in saturation 
of police or military against groups engaged in collective action.  From 1996 to 1999, the government 
used some force against protestors.   
Unfortunately, the information in MAR for Guyana does not go back to the 1960s.  However, 
given the level of violence reported in the 1960s, it seems clear that the level of physical violence since 
1985 does not compare (MAR 2003).  Therefore, it seems that in general the level of physical violence in 
Guyana has decreased recently.  This may be due to changes in the electoral system.  There is not enough 
evidence to make a causal link between the electoral system and violence, although correlation is clear.  
There is now a more equitable distribution of seats as compared to votes.  However, the seat distribution 
only shows representation, not political power and ability to change anything.  Both political parties think 
that the political situation in Guyana is a zero-sum game.  Violence was associated with the electoral 
system because it would determine who would be in power.  The violence was not directly related to the 
type of electoral system, but who would be in power as a result.  Given the legitimacy of the government 
and the internationally accepted elections, the PPP does not have to resort to violence to maintain control 
of the state.  The PNC is now more likely to turn to the court system for resolution, rather than violence, 
because acting out against an internationally accepted regime is a dangerous prospect both politically and 
physically.  Although the reality of intercommunal violence continues, it is at a lower level of violence 
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than during the 1960s and during the authoritarian period because of the electoral system and the 
legitimacy it bestows on the government. 
There is speculation that a full-blown ethnic conflict is always possible in Guyana.  The distrust 
and underlying fears of the people may give way at any time to a bitter war.  The PPP uses the violence 
that occurred during Burnham’s rule as a campaign issue.  They constantly evoke the terror of their 
constituencies as a way to ensure their continued success.  Given the fears of both sides (of violence 
and/or retribution), it is unlikely that any multi-ethnic government would succeed in the very near future 
(Calder 2005). 
It is clear that the ethnic groups still do not trust one another, and this distrust is likely to continue 
indefinitely.  With the pressure of national and international groups, the democracy can survive.  
However, there has been an increase in crime and weapons in the country and the 2006 elections are 
therefore a watershed event.  Election preparations and the elections themselves must be acceptable to all 
parties and be violence free.  The potential for violence is currently very high, and steps are being taken 
by GECOM and other government officials to help diminish the possibility. 
 Jagdeo has yet to implement the reforms he agreed to in 2001.  This lack of reform, coupled with 
the PPP dominating Parliament and ensuring that only their laws are passed, are only a few examples of 
the continuing political problems in Guyana.  In Parliament, the PNC and other opposition parties are 
impotent, and unable to do anything without the PPP’s approval.  Since the PPP has total domination in 
the Parliament, they do not consult with the opposition.  They do not need any bipartisan approval to act, 
and they do not seek it.  Even with free and fair elections, it is obvious that the inability of the 
government to change hands is fundamentally impacting ethnic conflict in Guyana. 
 While problems continue in Parliament and with the electoral system, it is important to note other 
issues in Guyana that may be affecting the violence.  First is that there have been no major attempts at 
conflict resolution in Guyana.  Regardless of the type of elections and electoral system, it is obvious that 
the democracy is not going to be accepted and respected by all without conflict resolution and democratic 
consolidation, although Carroll (2005) believes that the electoral system will have to be changed in order 
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to accomplish these.  Carroll (2005) and Mapendere (2005) both believe that ensuring free and fair 
elections has not and will not improve the situation in Guyana without changes to the electoral system, 
and that broad and deep conflict resolution must occur before the country can move forward. 
 Another extenuating circumstance involves the economic position of the ethnic groups in 
Guyana.  Pottie (2005) believes that the Indo-Guyanese have a, at least perceived, superior economic 
position.  In addition, many Guyanese expatriates are heavily involved in Guyanese politics.  Pottie 
(2005) believes that they are helping to fuel the conflict, by action and by moving funds into and out of 
the country.   
A final concern is with the Guyanese political culture.  Pottie (2005) noted a tabloid flare to 
politics.  Both the television and print media support this tabloid flare, and he felt that these forms of 
media were just extensions of personal and political agendas.  Indeed, the media are not all independent.  
There is only one major independent newspaper in Guyana.  The others tend to support either the PPP or 
the PNC.   
 
Other divided societies 
 This section will explore five other cases in order to test the above hypotheses.  Table IV shows 
the five states, as well as their ethnic makeup, their electoral system, and extenuating circumstances that 
may affect the state.  This section will also include available MAR data for the states and a description of 
their situations. 
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Table IV: Ethnic makeup, electoral system, and extenuating circumstances in divided societies 
Country Ethnic Makeup (CIA) Electoral System Extenuating Circumstances 
Guyana Indians 50% 
Africans 36% 
Mixed 7% 
Other 7% 
PR (mixed level)  
Mauritius Hindu 48% 
Creole 27% 
Muslim 16% 
Sino-Mauritian 3% 
Franco-Mauritian 2%  
FPTP & PR 
(Multi-member 
with best loser 
seats) 
Democratic culture 
Trinidad and Tobago Indian 40% 
Creole 37.5% 
Mixed 20.5% 
Other 2% 
FPTP Democratic culture; oil and 
gas economy 
Fiji Indigenous Fijian 51% 
Indian 44% 
Other 5% 
AV Only state mentioned with 
indigenous population with 
any power 
Sri Lanka Sinhalese 73.8%  
Sri Lankan Moors 7.2% 
Indian Tamil 4.6% 
Sri Lankan Tamil 3.9% 
Other 0.5% 
Unspecified 10%  
PR Continuing and violent 
internal struggle between 
the Tamils and the 
Sinhalese who are 
geographically distributed 
Lebanon Arab 95% 
Armenian 4% 
Other 1% 
Muslim 59.7% (Shi'a, 
Sunni, Druze, others) 
Christian 39%  
Other 1.3% 
PR Religion, not ethnicity, is 
the deciding factor, civil 
war ended in 1991, heavily 
influenced by neighboring 
countries, especially Syria 
 
 
In 1997, Fiji changed from a FPTP system to a majoritarian alternative vote (AV) system in order 
to grant more power to the Indo-Fijians, who had historically been disproportionately underrepresented in 
office.  Initially this system drew together the communal groups as expected with the AV system (a 
majoritarian electoral system), but the fact that the prime minister elected in 1999 was Indo-Fijian caused 
discontent among the indigenous Fijians.  A year later, there was a coup, which resulted in an increased 
level of communal conflict (Reilly 2001).  As Table VI shows, while intercommunal conflict existed in all 
years, the level of violence intensified after the electoral change in 1997.  The level of protest activity 
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remained constant.  There was no government repression noted under the FPTP system in 1996 (the 
earliest year data is available).  After the change in 1997, there was quite a lot of government repression 
reported, primarily under the indigenous Fijian government and after the coup (MAR 2003).  
 
 
Table V: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Guyana 
Source: MAR 2003 
Type of System Mixed PR 1992- 
Intercommunal 
Violence 
Acts of harassment 
Intercommunal 
conflict 
Exists all years 
Protest activity Resistance 
Small demonstrations 
Government 
Repression 
Arrests 
Property confiscation/destruction 
Police/military at marches 
Force against protestors 
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Table VI: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Fiji 
Source: MAR 2003 
Type of System FPTP 1970-1996 Single Member Alternative Vote 1997- 
Intercommunal 
Violence 
1990-1994, 1995: political agitation 
1996: acts of harassment 
 
1999: anti-group demonstrations 
2000: communal rioting 
Intercommunal 
conflict 
Exists all years Exists all years 
Protest activity Verbal opposition 1987 
Symbolic resistance 1988-9 
Small demonstrations 1990-91 
Symbolic resistance 1992-95 
Small demonstrations 1996 
Small demonstrations 1997-2000 
Government 
Repression 
None reported 
 
Many group members arrested during 
collective action 2000 
Leaders arrested, disappeared or 
detained during collective action 2000 
State of emergency against groups in 
collective action 1998 
State of emergency against group 
members not involved in collective 
action  2000 
Saturation of police/military against 
group members engaged in collective 
action 1998, not engaged in collective 
action 2000 
Use of force against protestors engaged 
in collective action 1998 
Military campaign against group 
members in collective action 2000 
 
 
 
Although Sri Lanka changed from a FPTP system to a mixed system, there is little to indicate that 
the switch influenced the ethnic conflict.  Ethnic conflict began in the 1950s when the Sinhalese passed a 
law making Sinhala the official language of the island.  This immediately provoked the anger of the Tamil 
speaking population.  Like the Afro-Guyanese, in Sri Lanka the Tamils are outnumbered greatly and 
could not, on their own, gain a majority of seats; they have been fighting against the Sinhalese for years.  
In the 2000 election, the electoral related violence was not between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, but 
between two (biologically) related Sinhalese politicians.  More than one political party represents each 
ethnic group, and if either of the Sinhalese parties did not receive an absolute majority, the other 
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Sinhalese party would join in a coalition in order to prevent the Tamils from gaining substantial power 
(Horowitz 2001).  Table VII shows there has been intercommunal conflict in all years.  Since the MAR 
data began recording events in Sri Lanka, there has been substantial intercommunal violence and 
government repression. 
 
Table VII: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Sri Lanka 
Source: MAR 2003 
Type of System Mixed PR 
Intercommunal 
Violence 
1990, 1997, 1999-2000: communal rioting 
1994, 1996: anti-group demonstrations 
1991-1995: acts of harassment 
Intercommunal 
conflict 
Exists all years reported 
Protest activity Symbolic resistance 1985-1989, 1991, 1994-5 
Small demonstrations 1996-1997 
Large demonstrations 1990, 1992-1993, 1998, 2000 
Government 
Repression 
Government repression 
Limited use of force against protestors engaged in collective action 1998, 2000 
Military campaigns against armed rebels engaged in collective action 1996-2000 
Military targets and destroys rebel areas 1996-2000 
Military massacre of group members not engaged in collective action 2000 
 
 
 
In Lebanon, multi-ethnic, multi-member constituencies elected representativess from an inter-
ethnic list.  The top roles (President, Prime Minister, Speaker of the House, and Vice-Speaker of the 
House) were constitutionally mandated to specific ethnic groups.  The candidates could not mobilize 
ethnic votes to elect them into another position.  Thus, cross-ethnic ties were common, as someone 
running for President would team with someone running for Prime Minister in order to increase the 
number of votes s/he received.  There was intra-ethnic conflict to get the position, which stymied the 
creation of political parties, as individual candidates were the focus of the elections.  For 30 years, from 
1943 until the beginning of the civil war in 1975/6, Lebanon had an unparalleled level of ethnic 
cooperation.  It has been seen as the emblem of consociationalism and power-sharing.  According to 
Horowitz (1985), the civil war generally had nothing to do with the electoral system, except in two 
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regards.  First, since there were no political parties and politics rallied around individuals, the practice of 
having private militias grew.  Second, since the posts were so rigid, there was no recourse for change 
except through violence.  The civil war ended in 1991 and the current system, technically in place in since 
the Ta’if Accord in 1989, but in practice in effect since 1992, gives a more equitable, but still sectarian 
division in the government.  This power-sharing government seems to be able to keep the ethnic conflict 
in check, and mitigate against the potential of conflict.  The influence of Syria is also a problem in 
Lebanon, although at least their military presence, along with that of Israel, has been removed.  Table 
VIII shows that there has been communal violence in all years reported with varying levels of 
intercommunal violence and government repression.  Since the change in the electoral system, Lebanon 
has had its share of conflict in the country.  Given the military presence of two external armies, it is 
difficult to relate these problems to the electoral system.  However, now that the other militaries are gone, 
Lebanon can be examined to see the role of the electoral system on the level of conflict.  One extenuating 
factor is the continued influence of Syria on Lebanon, and the political violence manifest in this.  One 
other note is that the groups in Lebanon are not divided along ethnic lines, but along confessional lines.  
While Table IV reflects the ethnic and religious lines, the more important distinctions (Shi’a, Sunni, 
Maronite, etc.) are not known.  Lebanon has not had an official census since the first part of the 20th 
century.  Experts agree, however, that no groups has a majority in the state. 
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Table VIII: Divided societies with changed electoral systems: Lebanon 
Source: MAR 2003 
Type of System PR 
Intercommunal 
Violence 
1990-1998: communal rioting 
1999: sporadic violent attacks 
2000: none manifest 
Intercommunal 
conflict 
Exists all years reported 
Protest activity Verbal opposition 1985-1992 
Medium demonstrations 1993 
Small demonstrations 1994-2000 
Government 
Repression 
Saturation of police/military against group members engaged or not in collective 
action 1996-1998 
Limited force used against group members engaged in collective action  1996-1998 
Domestic spying used 1998 
State of  emergency 1998 Unrestrained force used against group members engaged 
in collective action 1998 
Leaders arrested, disappeared or detained during collective action 1999 
Torture used against members who were engaged in collective action 1999 
Military campaigns used against members who were engaged in collective action 
1999 
 
In Mauritius, the British attempted to change the system to a PR system before independence.  
However, the political elites held out and the current system is a mixture of FPTP and PR.  There are 70 
members in the parliament; 62 of whom are elected in constituencies and eight of them are nominated as 
the ‘best losers’.  The island of Mauritius is made up of 20 constituencies; each voter gets to vote for three 
people.  The top three vote getters in each constituency win seats in the parliament.  The nearby island of 
Rodrigues gets two representatives and voters there get two votes.  The ‘best loser’ system is intended to 
make up for demographic discrepancies in parliament.  The Electoral Supervisory Commission, in order 
to ensure proportional representation of all the ethnic groups, selects eight losing candidates for 
parliament.  Regardless of the outcome of the election, Chinese and Muslim representatives are 
guaranteed a seat in the parliament.  The idea is to ensure that each of the four ethnic communities is 
proportionally represented in parliament, to ensure both representation and harmony.   
In the 1960s before independence, the island had a referendum, and 44% of the people voted that 
they did not want independence.  The Hindu population of Mauritius was more than half of the 
population, and the other ethnic groups (Creoles, Muslims, Sino-Mauritians, and Franco-Mauritians) 
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feared ethnic domination.  In fact, the Muslims wanted different ethnic voting lists for each group.  The 
current mixed system was a compromise to the Muslim groups.  Although the political parties were 
mainly ethnically based, the first Prime Minister invited all the opposition to join the government as a 
sign of national unity (Miles 1999).   
Because of the extreme difficulty of winning an election alone, since the Hindu population is split 
into two parties, and so no party has the support of more than half of the population, since 1968, all of the 
governments have been coalitions, and the four main parties have all allied with each other in elections.  
Because of a personality clash between leaders, two major Hindu parties arose to vie for government, 
choosing coalition partners from two other major parties (one essentially representing the Creoles and 
other a multi-ethnic party) and a menagerie of smaller parties, although the two Hindu parties can and 
have joined in a coalition in the past.  Mauritians are very proud of their democratic culture and would 
defy any attempts to corrupt it.  There was occasional violence in the 1960s and in the late 1990s, but for 
the most part, the island is a rare ethnically heterogeneous democracy.  There have been five successful, 
and peaceful, transfers of power because of elections (Miles 1999, Srebrnik 2002).   
As Table IV shows, Mauritius actually has an Indian descended population that is a majority of 
the population, like Guyana.  The Mauritian Muslims make up 16%.  In Guyana, the Indo-Guyanese are 
not fractured along religious lines.  In Mauritius, the British were much less involved and when they 
attempted to change the system to PR, the political elites refused, and instead created the current electoral 
system.   
 Additionally, there are differences in the political parties in the two states.  While both states have 
ethnically based political parties, the apanjaat system in Guyana has made the two major parties much 
more stringent in their ethnic makeup, regardless of the nominal numbers of the other ethnic group.  
There have been only a few new parties emerge in Guyana since independence, and none have been able 
to significantly effect the power balance.  Additionally, Guyana had a 28-year authoritarian period, and 
does not share the democratic culture found in Mauritius. 
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The number and purpose of the political parties is also starkly different.  First and foremost is that 
in Mauritius there are two political parties representing the Hindus community.  While the Hindus make 
up more than half of the population, their ethnic vote is split.  Except for the 1983 coalition, these two 
Hindu parties generally do not work together, but are always in different coalitions.  With a Hindu party 
as their base, the government must also include one of the other major parties, either the multi-ethnic 
party or the Creole majority party.   
Besides the precedent set by S. Ramgoolam, the nation’s first Prime Minister, of coalition 
building, the necessity of coalition building, and thus, power sharing, is also built into the electoral 
system.  Of the 70 seats, eight (more than 10%) are reserved and dispersed to the ‘best losers’ by the 
election commission.  This fact nearly destroys the possibility of winning a majority alone.  Additionally, 
the island of Rodrigues generally does not vote for members of the four larger parties, but instead have 
two unique parties.  Historically, two of the elected seats and two of the ‘best loser’ seats come from 
Rodrigues, even further diminishing the chances of any party winning alone.  Because the government 
changes often, the opposition is an integral part of the parliament, and does not walk out of parliamentary 
proceedings.  Doing so would diminish the people’s faith in the party and decrease their chance of 
winning the next election.  
There have only been three major outbursts of serious ethnic violence in Mauritius since the 
1960s.  The first two outbursts in the pre-independence era (1964-65 and 1968) were related to fears of 
Hindu domination.  More than thirty years passed before the 1999 riots, related to the suspicious death of 
a Creole singer while in police custody.  Elections in Mauritius do not get violent, there is no problem 
with the election rules, or how elections work.  Everyone agrees on the “rules of the game” and the people 
would not accept any attempts to interfere with or infringe upon their rights to democracy.   
Trinidad and Tobago have the same ethnicities as Guyana, but as Table IV indicates, there is a 
smaller gap in size between the two major groups.  Since the two major groups are similar in size, and 
parties are ethnically based, there is a potential for government to change hands.  Like Guyana, the 
Creoles (those of African descent) tend to dominate urban areas, while the rural areas are more Indian.   
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In the 1956 elections in Trinidad, the People’s National Movement (PNM), which had support 
from the urban Creoles, won 13 of 24 seats with 38.7% of the total vote in a FPTP system.  A Hindu 
dominated party, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), emerged from the opposition to win the 1958 
elections for the Federation Parliament, six seats to the PNM’s four seats.  Because of the FPTP system, 
even though the parties got about half of the total votes each, since the Hindus were more spread out in 
the rural areas, the DLP won more constituencies, while the PNM received three of their four in and 
around the capital.  The next year, the results were similar in the vote for country council, with the DLP 
receiving one more seat than the PNM.  The DLP was facing problems since the population was so 
similarly split.  In order to ensure victory, they realized they had to make overtures and give government 
positions to the Creoles in their party (1/3 of their votes came from the rural Creoles).  However, the DLP 
feared the Indians would stop supporting them if they did this, and the Creoles of the party left (Horowitz 
1985).   
A new political party did not emerge for the rural Creoles, and they felt obligated to vote for the 
PNM, essentially solidifying two ethnic parties.  The DLP began losing votes to the PNM.  In the 1960s, 
90% or more of the people were voting on an ethnic basis.  In 1971, the DLP boycotted elections, since 
their loss was expected.  A new Indian party captured 27% of the 1976 vote.  However, despite changes in 
party name, there remained an Indian and a Creole party.  As in Guyana, there are token members of the 
other ethnic group in each party, but their influence is small and they run only in the regions where the 
dominant ethnic group of the party is the minority (Horowitz 1985). 
In 1986, the PNM lost power.  There had been many complaints of discrimination during their 
rule.  As evidence, the Indo-Trinidadians pointed to the lack of representation in the cabinets and the 
overwhelming number of Creoles in the civil service.  In 1986, a steep recession caused a number of 
angry Indians and Creoles to create a party to oppose the PNM.  Surprisingly, they won.  This multi-
ethnic National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) lasted only a year, the victim of inter-ethnic bickering.  
In 1991, the PNM was able to able to retake the government, with the Indian based United National 
Congress (UNC) in opposition.  In 1995, the PNM lost power to an Indian alliance of the UNC and the 
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NAR.  The UNC was able to regain office in the 2000 elections, but lost it again in 2002 to the PNM 
(Premdas 2001).   
There have been consistent free and fair elections in Trinidad since 1946, although the island did 
not gain its independence until 1962.  There is thus a culture of democracy, and even when the Indians 
did not think they could win, they still voted, except in 1971.  Generally, there have not been human 
rights abuses against the people, and election turnover has been peaceful.  Trinidad also benefits from oil 
and gas based economy, which gives it one of the highest rates of average national income in the less 
developed world.  Trinidad has a bicameral legislature.  The Senate is appointed by various actors in the 
country (ruling party, president, and opposition party) while the House of Representatives is elected via 
FPTP (Premdas 2001).   
Although they have inherited the same ethnic groups as Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago have not 
had the high level of violence seen in Guyana.  While under Creole rule from the 1960s to 1985, there 
was not widespread violence against the Indians.  There was ethnic discrimination, but currently, Trinidad 
does not suffer from the same type of distrust and fear that Guyana does.  Trinidad’s two major ethnic 
parties are so similar in size that no party dominates.  This is clearly their starkest difference in 
comparison to Guyana.   
 
Conclusions 
H1 predicted that in a divided society with ethnically based political parties, the type of 
government system and electoral system would affect the potential for conflict.  Chart I repeats the 
expected outcomes.  Chart II summarizes the countries examined here.  Those which fit the hypothesis are 
marked with a *.  Guyana and Sri Lanka both have parliamentary-PR systems, and both act as expected 
by the hypothesis.  In Guyana, which has parliamentary mixed PR system, that is, two levels of 
proportional representation, on a national party list level, and on a regional geographic level, conflict 
exists as predicted.  In Sri Lanka conflict also exists as predicted.  
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Fiji, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago have parliamentary plurality/majoritarian systems. In 
Fiji, with a parliamentary majoritarian system, conflict exists as predicted.  In Mauritius, which has a 
mixed parliamentary plurality/PR system, that is, multi-member districts with FPTP, and the best loser 
proportional representation system (since this is predominantly FPTP, I categorize it as such), conflict 
surprisingly does not occur with any frequency.  In Trinidad and Tobago, which has a parliamentary 
plurality system, conflict surprisingly does not occur with any frequency.   
In Lebanon, with a presidential PR system, conflict occurred, but not generally because of the 
electoral system.  There were no cases of presidential plurality/majoritarian cases considered. 
Four of the six cases acted in the expected direction predicted by the hypothesis.  Mauritius and 
Trinidad and Tobago did not.  These are the only two states with uninterrupted elections since 
independence.  They also have the best functioning economic systems of the cases.  Economic stability 
and democratic culture may be extenuating circumstances here that alter the outcome of this hypothesis.  
Additionally, the ethnic groups in Trinidad and Tobago are of similar size, while the Hindu group in 
Mauritius, while a majority, is not a unified group.  The additional hypotheses may help explain these two 
cases. 
 
Chart I: Expected Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies 
Type of executive/ 
How legislature is elected 
Presidential Parliamentary 
PR Conflict not likely Conflict likely 
Plurality/Majoritarian Conflict somewhat likely Conflict most likely 
 
 
Chart II: Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies 
Type of executive/ 
How legislature is elected 
Presidential Parliamentary 
PR Lebanon* Guyana* 
Sri Lanka* 
Plurality/Majoritarian Conflict somewhat likely Mauritius 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Fiji* 
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H2 predicted that in a divided society with ethnically based political parties where one ethnicity is 
more than 50% of the population, a proportional representation system would not prevent ethnic conflict 
and insecurity.  As shown in Chart III, the cases of the parliamentary Guyana, Sri Lanka, and Fiji support 
this hypothesis.  Trinidad and Tobago and Lebanon do not have one dominant ethnicity.  The relative size 
of the ethnic groups in Trinidad and Tobago best explains their avoidance of conflict.  One ethnically 
based political party does not have a majority, and there is a mixed-race party to help balance the Creole 
and Indian parties.  The government can and does alternate.  Unlike Guyana, each political party has a 
chance of attaining government in elections.  Hindus in Mauritius make up about half of the population, 
but conflict does not frequently occur there, since the Hindu vote splits between parties. 
 
Chart III: Outcomes of Electoral Systems in Ethnically Divided Societies with majority ethnic 
groups 
Type of executive/ 
How legislature is elected 
Presidential Parliamentary 
PR Conflict not likely Guyana* 
Sri Lanka* 
Plurality/Majoritarian Conflict somewhat likely Mauritius 
Fiji* 
 
 
H3 predicted that power-sharing would help prevent ethnic conflict and improve security.  A 
power sharing government will allow representation of minorities in the government.  Minority 
representation assures that the government hears the voices of the people, and that issues will be brought 
to attention before conflict erupts.  Mauritius and Lebanon are the best cases of power-sharing in the set.  
The ‘best loser’ system in Mauritius helps prevent ethnic conflict there.  All of the ethnic groups are 
represented in the parliament, and all of the voices are heard.  In Lebanon, the consociational system 
rigidly prescribes the positions of ethnic groups in government; there are perpetual winners and perpetual 
losers, although this was not the main cause of conflict in the country.  While this encourages inter-group 
cooperation, it discourages intra-group cooperation.  While the conflict generally was not the result of the 
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electoral system, the rigid prescription of positions may have fomented the potential for conflict.  
Mauritius has been able to overcome its predicted violence, but Lebanon has not.  Besides the obvious 
effects of external actors, in Mauritius, the ethnic groups naturally formed coalitions, and there were no 
rigid positions prescribed constitutionally.  Only the ‘best loser’ seats are directly related to ethnicity, 
there are no other serious ethnic constraints on the system. 
The potential for alternation in power in Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago have similar effects 
as formal power-sharing.  The potential for alternation reduces the stakes of winning control of the 
government, which reduces ethnic tension. 
Evidence from Guyana’s experience 1964 shows that demonstrations related to changing the 
electoral system to the PR system were the most violent.  More people died, more destruction was caused, 
and more government repression occurred because of the shift to the PR system than the FPTP system 
(used 1957-1961).  From 1964 through 1966, Guyana was in a state of emergency.  There was heightened 
security and more civic restrictions during this time than previously.   
 The violence associated with FPTP and PR systems in Guyana were not necessarily about the 
type of electoral system, and since the PPP and the PNC were both of the same ideological type, this does 
not seem to have been the reason for violence (although the United States and the United Kingdom 
perceived a difference when they favored the PNC over the PPP).  Instead, they were in response to the 
fact that one party was out of power.  The 1962 and 1963 PNC/UF strikes were an attempt to destabilize 
the PPP government and prove Jagan an ineffective leader, unfit to bring Guyana into independence.  The 
1964 PPP strike was a response to the change of electoral system that would bring the PNC/UF into 
office.  Thus, the strikes were less about the actual system and more about the loss of power that would 
occur because of the proposed changes in the electoral system in a perceived zero-sum game. 
 However, the immediate effect of the change to a PR system in Guyana was that the apanjaat 
system immediately spread throughout the country.  The violence associated with elections was no longer 
restricted to mixed race areas where the election could go either way, but spread to areas where one race 
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was clearly in high proportion.  The effect of changing to a PR system was that the potential for electoral 
violence was more geographically widespread.   
 Currently, because of the system, the PPP is essentially destined to win each election, since they 
are the slim majority ethnic group.  The PNC is not willing to become the loyal opposition, and will likely 
continue to not support the government.  The conflict in Guyana is deeply rooted and will be difficult to 
overcome. 
 Even with a PR system, since the Indo-Guyanese make up more than half of the population, they 
are unlikely to be unseated.  However, there are several small parties in Guyana.  If these were to team 
with the PNC, the election results would be much closer, and if the small parties were able to garnish 
enough Indo-Guyanese voters, a PNC coalition might be formed.  However, this would just continue the 
domination of one ethnic group over the other.  I would recommend that any important small party not 
align themselves with either group.  By remaining independent, a small party could force debate and 
dialogue in both the Parliament, and in the wider country. 
 The 2006 elections should prove to be an important watershed event in Guyana’s history, and 
deserve future research.  Another future source of research will be a more thorough review of the ranked 
versus unranked relationships in Guyana, and the usefulness of the ethnic mobilization literature in 
describing this case. 
When considering ethnic violence, the type of electoral system is not the only factor to consider.  
The distribution of power in a state is the larger framework within which to work.  States must avoid the 
zero-sum game, and all parties must have reason to play by the rules of the game. States must implement 
designs that help minimize the zero-sum game.  States can accomplish this through official power-sharing 
arrangements, the potential for government turnover, or other options like the party incentive structure.  
Party incentive structures, and how they can change the dynamics in a state, are one important avenue for 
future research. 
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Policy Recommendations 
My first recommendation for Guyana is to open the party lists.  A shift to an open PR system will 
provide the populace with a better understanding of whom their candidates are and increase satisfaction 
with the system.  In order to increase accountability, regional constituencies should assign MPs to specific 
areas.  To create actual accountability, regional MPs should be elected on a basis similar to Nigerian 
presidential elections.  MPs should receive a percentage of the full regional vote, as well as a threshold of 
votes in a subset of the region.  On the national list, voters should be able to choose which candidate they 
support. 
 A second recommendation is that the government should increase involvement with the PNC.  
This can be accomplished by having members of the opposition in key committees and in cabinet 
positions.  Initially, this could be expected only in military/civil service types of representation, since the 
Afro-Guyanese dominate these industries.  However, eventually this could be expected to evolve into 
greater representation in other fields. 
A third recommendation is to allow a limited opposition veto (Lijphart 1977).  This could not be 
widespread in all fields, since the opposition is likely to use it to stymie the government.  However, in 
police/military fields, in civil service areas, electoral reform, and in urban renewal, it might be appropriate 
for the opposition to have a veto on policy.  In these areas, the Afro-Guyanese tend to be better 
represented.  If the opposition were given a veto on policy, they would be expected to wield it only to 
address poor legislation in these areas.  One simple way to implement would be to require 2/3 votes to 
pass legislation in these areas.  Many countries already have this in place for certain functioned areas, 
such as the United States and constitutional reform. 
A fourth recommendation is to decrease the power of the president (who is the head of the 
government in their parliamentary system).  To reiterate, the president is the head of the largest party in 
the legislation and s/he appoints the Prime Minister.  Although the president is the chief of state, and the 
Prime Minister is technically the head of government, in effect, the president is the head of both.  Given 
the current structure of the political system, the president wields ultimate authority.  With the PPP in 
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power in the legislature and in the presidency, they have little reason to converse with opposition parties.  
A decrease in presidential power would increase the power of parliament.  This is expected to produce 
more debate and dialogue between the parties.  If the legislature felt more empowered and distant from 
the president, they may be able to broach less ethnically charged legislation and work together with the 
opposition.  Obviously, this could not take place without the implementation of the first recommendation.  
Otherwise, legislators would feel completely beholden to their party, and could be punished with a low 
ranking on the next party list.  One way to implement this would be through a shift to a presidential 
system, and to have the president elected directly by the people; this would add another voting item on 
each voter’s ballot.  While this might produce the same results, as the Indo-Guyanese have a majority in 
the country, as stated elsewhere their slim majority is feasibly surmountable.  Given the fact that there is 
general discontent among many people, especially given the current crime wave, allowing the people a 
direct say in the President might have interesting and unpredictable results.   
 A final recommendation is to increase the level of civic education.  By teaching children to think 
of themselves as Guyanese first, and their ethnic groups secondly, the country may be able to increase the 
likelihood of continued peace into the future.   
 Guyana has not had severe ethnic conflict for many years.  Some see the country as constantly on 
the brink of conflict.  However, there is also a shared history and experience.  The people see themselves 
as Guyanese—maybe not as Guyanese first, but they do have a sense of patriotism.  This can be used 
advantageously to decrease the chances of ethnic conflict.  Full blown ethnic conflict is not preordained, it 
can be avoided if there is a concerted effort to mitigate it, as long as changes to the political system 
support this goal.   
One way to help remedy this problem is to create a system where the people are able to know 
which representative represents them.  One version of this would mean a single member district, and the 
FPTP system would need to be used.  However, in keeping with the PR system, another way to resolve 
this issue is to assign representatives to constituencies after their election.  There would be no way to hold 
 55
these representatives accountable to the constituency they are assigned to, as they could rely on the votes 
of another region at the next election, but this may help create a culture of accountability.   
In a closed list PR system, the order of the candidates elected is chosen by the party with no 
opinion of the voters taken into account.  In the open list system, voters can indicate their preferred party 
as well as their preferred candidates of the party.  A third type of system is a free system in which people 
vote for candidates and the seats are apportioned to parties based on the votes of the individual 
candidates.  Guyana currently has a closed list PR system.  In fact, the voters do not receive the list of 
candidates ahead of time, they just vote for the party they prefer on Election Day.   
One easy way to increase voter satisfaction would be to reveal the list ahead of time.  That way 
the voters know for whom they are voting.  An even better option would be to convert the system to an 
open list or free list system.  This would require that the candidates campaigned throughout the country to 
garner votes, and although the candidates would be loyal to the party, they would be able to put a face on 
the party and speak for themselves, thereby increasing accountability.  If the system would be unattractive 
for the nationwide PR vote, it would at least be advisable for the regional constituency votes.  A free list 
system would logistically be more difficult to implement, since it entails a radical departure from the 
norm and the way that the votes are counted and dispersed is quite tricky.  These changes would improve 
accountability and the representation of the people.  
Whether or not the PPP is removed from office in the 2006 election, they have to make some 
changes to the system.  The current system gives the opposition parties no power.  The PPP is able to 
control all the branches of government and unilaterally pass any laws they desire.  In order to improve the 
chances for no violence in the future, the government should follow the recommendations set out above.   
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